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NOTES

The Conflict Between the Alien
Tort Statute Litigation
and Foreign Amnesty Laws
ABSTRACT

Since the landmark case Fildrtiga v. Peha-Irala,foreign
individuals have increasingly utilized the Alien Tort Statute to
raise claims of human rights violations in the United States
Defendants, however, have alleged that
federal courts.
comity necessitate dismissal of the
international
principles of
in which the human rights
country
suit when the foreign
amnesty. While the
defendants
has
granted
violations occurred
if the case
permits
dismissal
comity
doctrine of international
of a
affairs
internal
the
requires a federal court to adjudicate
v.
Alvarezforeign country, the Supreme Court held, in Sosa
Machain, that the Alien Tort Statue grants U.S. courts
jurisdiction over violations that are universally recognized and
specifically defined. This Note argues that this standard
encompasses jus cogens crimes such as genocide, torture,
summary execution, disappearance, arbitrary detention, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, slavery, and cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment. An analysis of international law
demonstrates that amnesties that provide blanket immunity for
serious international crimes, such as violations of jus cogens
norms, are illegal. Given this illegality, this Note argues that,
even in the face of political pressure from the U.S. and other
countries, federal courts should decline to dismiss Alien Tort
Statue cases under internationalcomity when a foreign amnesty
law provides impunity for jus cogens crimes.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Starting in the 1980s, two phenomena in international law began
to develop concurrently: the use of the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)1 as a
vehicle for pursuing claims against human rights violators in the
United States, 2 and the use of granting amnesty in order to bring
peace to nations experiencing internal conflict.3 Since the landmark
case Fildrtigav. Peha-Irala,4 foreign individuals have used the ATS
to pursue international human rights claims in the United States
federal courts. However, while the ATS provides redress for human
rights violations, foreign amnesties provide immunity for crimes
committed during conflicts in order to end civil war and bring peace
and reconciliation. Recently, the two developments have clashed in

1.
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The statute has been called the
Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), Alien Tort Act (ATA), or Alien Tort Statute (ATS). This
Note will adopt the terminology used by the Supreme Court in Sosa v. AlvarezMachain and refer to the statute as the Alien Tort Statute. See 542 U.S. 692, 697

(2004).
2.

See BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN

U.S. COURTS 1-2 (2d ed. 2008) ('The ATS was rarely invoked until 1980, when the
Second Circuit's landmark decision in Fildrtiga v. Peiia-Irala recognized that the
statute authorizes claims for violations of international human rights norms.").
3.

See FAUSTIN

Z. NTOUBANDI,

AMNESTY FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY

UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (2007) (granting amnesty to criminals of interstate wars
gave way to the granting of amnesty in intrastate wars).
4.
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
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cases where the defendants claim that a suit under the ATS would
violate an amnesty granted to defendants in the country where the
tort or harm took place. 5
The conflict between El Salvador's 1993 grant of amnesty for
crimes committed during its civil war and a recent ATS suit in federal
court illustrate this tension. In 2003, El Salvadoran victims of
extrajudicial killings and torture filed a complaint 6 in U.S. federal
court pursuant to the ATS 7 and the Torture Victims Protection Act
(TVPA). 8 The defendant, El Salvador's Sub-Secretary of Defense and
Public Security from 1979 to 1981, claimed that the El Salvadoran
amnesty law barred the plaintiffs' suit in the U.S. 9 To support the
defendant's claim, the Republic of El Salvador filed an amicus brief
arguing that the U.S. court should defer to El Salvador's chosen
method for handling domestic issues.10 How should U.S. federal
courts resolve such conflicts?
There is no easy resolution to the conflict that occurs when an
ATS litigant is confronted with a defendant protected by a foreign
amnesty. U.S. courts have relied on prudential doctrines to guide
their ATS decisions," but the conflict is further complicated when an
amnesty is present because it is not squarely established whether
amnesties are legal under international law.12
This Note attempts to determine under what conditions U.S.
courts should dismiss a case when an ATS suit conflicts with a
foreign state's amnesty law. Part II provides a brief history of the
development of the ATS and the use of amnesty laws around the
world and describes the conflict that exists between the two. Part III
analyzes the use of international comity and the status of amnesties
under international law as ways U.S. courts could dismiss an ATS
claim involving a foreign amnesty. Part IV suggests that U.S. federal
courts, when faced with a conflict between an ATS cause of action and
a corresponding amnesty law, should only dismiss a claim when the
amnesty excludes violations of jus cogens crimes. Using examples of

5.
See Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 494-96 (6th Cir. 2009) (claiming El
Salvador's amnesty precludes a claim under the ATS); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l
Bank Ltd., 504 F. 3d 254, 296-97 (2d Cir. 2007) (discussing whether South Africa's
efforts to address the effects of apartheid warrant dismissing the suit).
6.
Carranza,559 F.3d at 491.
7.
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
8.
Torture Victim Prevention Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) (codified as note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
9.
Chavez v. Carranza, No. 03-2932 M1/P, 2005 WL 2659186, at *3 (W.D.
Tenn. Oct. 18, 2005).
10.
Brief of The Republic of El Salvador as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Appellant, Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2009) (No. 06-6234).
11.
See, e.g., Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 561-62 (9th Cir. 2005)
(dismissing claims on grounds of political question doctrine); Doe v. Unocal Corp., 963
F. Supp. 880, 899 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (dismissing claims on act of state grounds).
See infra Part III.
12.
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the El Salvadoran and South African amnesties, this Note concludes
that courts should look to the developing international standards
regarding the acceptability of amnesties in determining whether to
dismiss an ATS claim.
II.

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ATS LITIGATION AND AMNESTIES

A. The Alien Tort Statute
The ATS, originally part of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and codified
today as 28 U.S.C. § 1350, states: "The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." 3 There is no record of the ATS's legislative history, but
recent scholarship has uncovered its "jurisprudential background."14
The framers worried about the United States' inability to comply with
international law and, in particular, the responses of powerful
European states when torts were committed against their diplomats
in the United States.' 5 For example, in the 1780s, two disputes
concerning foreign diplomats left the federal government
embarrassed and unable to intervene since the federal courts had no
jurisdiction over the claims.16 Thus, the ATS granted the federal
government jurisdiction over these types of cases 17 and demonstrated
"an articulated scheme of federal control -over external affairs ...
where principles of international law are in issue."1 8
The ATS was rarely used between 1795 and 1976.19
The
modern use of the ATS in the landmark Fildrtiga v. Peiia-Irala
decision arose from the context provided by an increase in global
human rights norms and international agreements. 20 Fildrtiga had
been tortured and killed by a Paraguayan police officer in 1976.21 In
Fildrtiga,the Second Circuit held that the ATS authorized claims
against foreign individuals for violations of international human

13.
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
14.
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 2, at 3-4. For further discussion, see the
background section of the Supreme Court's discussion in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542

U.S. 692, 712-26 (2004).
15.

STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 2, at 4-5.

Id. at 5.
16.
17.
Id.; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) ("There is evidence ... that the intent of this section
was to assure aliens access to federal courts to vindicate any incident which, if
mishandled by a state court, might blossom into an international crisis.").
18.
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).
19.
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 2, at 7.
20.

630 F.2d at 883-84, 888.

21.

STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 2, at 8.
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rights norms brought by foreign individuals in federal court.2 2
23
Approximately 150 ATS claims were filed in the wake of Fildrtiga.
Congress weighed in by enacting the TVPA in 1992.24 The TVPA
provides a cause of action for torture or extrajudicial execution
committed under color of foreign law against aliens or U.S. citizens. 25
The TVPA's legislative history explicitly endorses the ATS as
interpreted by Fildrtiga.26
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the Supreme Court finally
addressed the ATS and generally endorsed the approach of Fildrtiga
and the lower courts by holding that the ATS constitutionally permits
courts to recognize common law claims for violations of international
law.2 7 However, the claim must "rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the ... 18th-century paradigms" on which
the statute was based.28 This interpretation of "a tort in violation of
the law of nations" is only slightly different from the "universal,
obligatory, and definable" formula that the courts developed after
29
Fildrtiga.
Therefore, the crimes of genocide, torture, summary
execution, disappearance, arbitrary detention, war crimes, crimes
against humanity, slavery, and cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment-crimes that had been recognized by courts as creating
ATS jurisdiction pre-Sosa-most likely trigger ATS jurisdiction postSosa as well.30
Importantly, the opinion also clarified choice of law issues, which
until Sosa had caused problems and vast inconsistencies among the
lower courts.3 1 The opinion clarified that while the substantive
violation is governed by international law, federal common law
provides the cause of action and governs non-substantive issues. 32
The Court in Sosa declined to "close the door to further
independent judicial recognition of actionable international norms"

22.
630 F.2d at 887-88.
23.
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 2, at 12, 16. The majority of these claims were
dismissed for failure to allege recognizable violation of international law. Id. at 12.
24.
Torture Victim Prevention Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73
(1992) (codified as note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
25.
Torture Victim Prevention Act of 1991 § 2.
26.
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 2, at 17 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 102-367, at 3
(1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84, 86 ("[The ATS] has ... important uses and
should not be replaced.")).
27.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004).
28.
Id. at 725.
29.
STEPHENS ET AL., supranote 2, at 47.
30.
Id. at 50.
31.
Id. at 36-38.
32.
William R. Casto, The New Federal Common Law of Tort Remedies for

Violations of InternationalLaw, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 635, 641 (2006); see generally Sosa,
542 U.S. 692 (holding that the ATS constitutionally permits courts to recognize
common law claims for violations of international law).
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but cautioned that "the judicial power should be exercised on the
understanding that the door is still ajar subject to vigilant
doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms
today."33 In an important footnote, the Supreme Court identified two
principles that would further limit the availability of relief in federal
courts: (1) the exhaustion of remedies available in the domestic legal
system; and (2) a policy of case-specific deference to the political
branches.34

Even though "case-specific deference" to the executive branch
made its debut in Sosa, scholars have argued that it is not a new
doctrine of deference.3 5 Courts have long used several prudential
doctrines to dismiss ATS cases. 36 The political question doctrine, act
of state doctrine, international comity, and the foreign affairs
doctrine have been used by defendants in ATS litigation to claim that
the litigation interferes with the sovereign rights of a foreign
government, requiring the case to be dismissed.3 7 While the footnote
in Sosa has generated much scholarly debate,3 8 post-Sosa lower
courts have ultimately applied the case-specific deference together
with existing doctrines, such as the political question and foreign
affairs doctrines.39 As a result, ATS litigation post-Sosa appears
unchanged for the most part, and courts have generally applied the
same pre-Sosa doctrines. 40
B. Amnesty
While the development of ATS legal jurisprudence in the United
States permitted victims of human rights abuses to obtain redress,
the increase in the use of amnesty laws in many countries following
civil strife has conversely denied redress to many of those victims.
Amnesty laws have long been a part of inter-state peace agreements,

33.
542 U.S. at 729.
34.
Id. at 733 n.21.
35.
Recent Cases, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2292, 2297 (2006).
36.
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 2, at 337.
37.
Id.
38.
See, e.g., James Boeving, Half Full . . . or Completely Empty?:
Environmental Alien Tort Claims Post Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL.
L. REV. 109, 128 (2006) (discussing the discretion that courts possess to dismiss cases);
Margarita S. Clarens, Note, Deference, Human Rights and the Federal Courts: The Role
of the Executive in Alien Tort Statute Litigation, 17 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 415, 41617 (2007) (discussing deference to the political branches).
39.
Lungisile Ntsebeza v. Daimler, AG, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y.
2009) ("Sosa's reference to 'case-specific deference' implicates either the political
question or international comity doctrine." (citing Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank
Ltd., 504 F. 3d 254, 262 n.10 (2d Cir. 2007)); see also Recent Cases, supra note 35, at
2297 n.38 (discussing lower court deference).
40.
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 2, at 21; see also Clarens, supra note 38, at
431 (discussing the role that deference to the executive still plays).
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dating back to 1286 BC. 4 1 Amnesty is "an act of sovereign power
designed to apply the principle of tabula rasa to past offences, usually
committed against the State, in order to end proceedings already
initiated or that are to be initiated, or verdicts that have already been
pronounced." 42 As amnesties have become increasingly absent in
international peace agreements and inter-state wars occur with less
frequency, 43 current amnesties are more often used to end civil wars,
insurrectional war, and domestic political disturbances. 44
The purposes of an amnesty may vary depending on the nature
of the conflict. 45 Amnesties have been justified as necessary to end
recurring violence, bring about peaceful transition, and serve as an
important incentive for key players in the conflict to cooperate in a
process of transition.4 6 Amnesties have also been justified as aiding
in national reconciliation and forgiveness. 47 While amnesties may
reduce or even eliminate the ability to bring perpetrators of crimes to
justice, the underlying assumption of amnesty is that it is a more
appropriate way of achieving a lasting and peaceful coexistence than
punishment.4 8
The scope of amnesties may also vary dramatically: general
amnesties provide immunity to everyone for all wrongful acts
committed during the war, 49 while limited amnesty provides
immunity only for specific offenses or particular groups of offenders.50
Furthermore, internal amnesties are primarily domestic, while
external amnesties are used in inter-state peace agreements. 5
Amnesties can cover both civil and criminal liability of the
individual. 5 2
Amnesties found in domestic instruments concluding a civil war
or resolving political strife generally cover offenses "committed in the
course or in relation to a specific conflict."5 3 Some countries may

41.
NTOUBANDI, supra note 3, at 12; ANDREAS O'SHEA, AMNESTY FOR CRIME IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 5, 7-21 (2002).
42.
NTOUBANDI, supra note 3, at 9; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 82-83
(6th ed. 1991) (providing a similar definition of "amnesty").
43.
O'SHEA, supra note 41, at 21-22.
44.
NTOUBANDI, supra note 3, at 5; O'SHEA, supra note 41, at 22. Amnesties
have been employed in Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Burundi, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Colombia, the Comoros, Croatia, Cyprus,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana, Haiti, Jordan, Mauritania, Mauritius, Nepal, Oman,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Syria, Serbian
Republic of Yugoslavia, and Zaire. Id.
45.
NTOUBANDI, supranote 3, at 24.
46.
O'SHEA, supra note 41, at 23.
47.
Id.
Id.
48.
49.
NTOUBANDI, supranote 3, at 12.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 32.
52.
53.
Id. at 30.
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distinguish between international crimes and political and related
common crimes to define the scope of their amnesty, often excluding
international crimes from the amnesty. 54
For example, the
Guatemalan National Reconciliation Law of November 18, 1996,
made an exception for the most serious crimes such as forced
disappearances, torture, and genocide, and the Honduras Amnesty
Law Decree of July 1991 excluded forced disappearances.5 5 Other
countries, however, have granted blanket amnesties that did not
exclude the crimes of torture, disappearances, abduction, or
extrajudicial killings. 56
In South Africa, the epilogue to the Interim Constitution of 1993
provided that "in order to advance reconciliation and reconstruction,
amnesty shall be granted in respect of acts, omissions[,] and offences
associated with political objectives committed in the course of the
conflict of the past."57 It gave no definition of "conflict of the past" or
"acts, omissions[,] and offences associated with political objectives."58
"The subsequent Amnesty Law of 1995 later defined acts associated
with political objectives .

.

. to cover both perpetrators of apartheid

and common criminals."59
Instead of prosecuting and trying
individuals involved in political crimes (e.g., apartheid) and common
crimes, South Africa established its Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. 60 In order to receive amnesty from the Amnesty
Committee, "[i]ndividual perpetrators of past wrongs [had to] give a
full account of what they [did] and the context within which it was
done."6 1
The amnesty in El Salvador was enacted by the legislature after
the Truth Commission released its report implicating several elected
officials. 62 During the 1980s, a civil war raged in El Salvador, leaving
thousands dead, missing, or tortured. 63 Between 1989 and 1992, the
government of El Salvador and the opposition group Farabundo Marti

54.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 29-30.
55.
56.
Id. at 30.
57.
Id. at 29.
58.
Id.
Id.
59.
60.
O'SHEA, supra note 41, at 45 n.48.
Id.
61.
62.
Elizabeth B. Ludwin, Trials and Truth Commissions in Argentina and El
Salvador, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSES 273, 286 (Jane E. Stormseth ed., 2003); see also Ley de Amnistia General
para la Consolidacion de la Paz [Law of General Amnesty for the Consolidation of
Peace], Legislative Decree No. 486 (1993) (El. Sal.) [hereinafter El Salvador Amnesty
Decree] (granting amnesty); U.N. Sec. Council, The Comm'n on the Truth for El Sal.,

From Madness to Hope: The 12-Year War in El Salvador: Report of the Commission on
the Truth for El Salvador, 18-20, U.N. Doc. S/25500 (Apr. 1, 1993) [hereinafter Truth
Comm'n Report] (discussing the foundation and role of the Truth Commission).
Ludwin, supra note 62, at 283-84.
63.
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National Liberation Front (FMLN) negotiated an end to the war with
the help of the United Nations. 64 The Peace Agreement of January
16, 1992, set up the Commission on the Truth, which was charged
with "investigating serious acts of violence that have occurred since
1980 and whose impact on society urgently demands that the public
should know the truth."6 5 Once the commission released its report,
however, the Salvadoran legislature passed a general amnesty
granting "absolute and unconditional amnesty" to anyone who
participated in "political crimes, related common crimes, and common
crimes committed by at least [twenty] persons, before March 1,
1992."66

Amnesties are not generally considered to have extraterritorial
effect, barring only prosecution within the state enacting the
amnesty. 67 Even if an individual is immune from prosecution in his
or her own nation, the International Criminal Court could assert
jurisdiction, the United Nations Security Council could create an ad
hoc tribunal, or another country could prosecute the individual under
the principle of universal jurisdiction, 68 a principle based on the
theory that particular crimes affect the fundamental interests of the
international community as a whole.69
The legality of amnesties under international law is widely
debated, and their legality is "in a state of transition and considerable
uncertainty."7 0 On the one hand, many of the crimes protected by
amnesties are violations of jus cogens norms, such as crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and genocide.7 1 Several treaties, such as the
Genocide Convention and the Convention Against Torture create a
duty to prosecute genocide and torture. 72 For example, El Salvador's
amnesty laws of 1992 and 1993 were held to violate El Salvador's

64.
65.
66.

Truth Comm'n Report, supranote 62, at 31-35.
Id. at 179-81.
El Salvador Amnesty Decree, supra note 62, art. 1 (granting amnesty).

67.

Diane F. Orentlicher, Striking a Balance: Mixed Law Tribunals and

Conflicts of Jurisdiction,in JUSTICE FOR CRIMES AGAINST HUMANiTY 213, 234 (Mark
Lattimer & Phillipe Sands QC eds., 2003); Charles P. Trumbull IV, Giving Amnesties a
Second Chance, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 283, 304 (2007).
Trumbull, supra note 67, at 304.
68.
69.
Leila Nadya Sadat, Exile, Amnesty and InternationalLaw, 81 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 955, 975 (2006) ("[Universal jurisdiction is predicated largely on the notion
that some crimes are so heinous that they offend the interest of all humanity, and,
indeed, imperil civilization itself.").
70.
Trumbull supra note 67, at 285; see Sadat, supra note 69, at 971-72
(discussing differing views on the validity of amnesties under international law); see
also infra Part III.B (discussing in more detail the legality of amnesties under
international law).
71.
Sadat, supra note 69, at 971-72 ("Examples [of violations of customary
international law] include war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.").
72.
NTOUBANDI, supra note 3, at 3-4; Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc.
No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture].
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obligations under Article 1 of the American Convention on Human
Rights in part because the amnesty applies to crimes against
humanity.73
On the other hand, several states have argued that support for
the legality of amnesties is found in Article 6(5) of the Additional
Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions. 74 Article 6(5) states that "[a]t
the end of hostilities, the authorities in power shall endeavor to grant
the broadest possible amnesty to persons who have participated in
the armed conflict, or those deprived of their liberty for reasons
related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or
detained."75
Some scholars, viewing amnesties as an important tool for
bringing peace to civil war and facilitating transitional governments,
argue that continued use of amnesties by states demonstrates that
amnesty laws are not per se illegal under customary international
law.76
C. ATS Conflicts with Amnesty
The conflict between amnesties and international law clearly
manifests itself in U.S. federal courts when a defendant claims
immunity from suit under the ATS due to a foreign amnesty. The
ATS provides a cause of action to plaintiffs for certain violations of
customary international law, such as torture, genocide, and
extrajudicial killing,77 but in some instances, these crimes are
covered by amnesty laws of the defendant's country. For example, in
Chavez v. Carranza, several plaintiffs filed ATS and TVPA claims
against Nicolas Carranza, alleging extrajudicial killings and torture
during the Salvadoran civil war.7 8 The defendant, in his motion for
judgment on the pleadings, argued that the court should decline to
exercise jurisdiction because the broad amnesty law passed by the
Salvadoran legislature barred plaintiffs' claims, and that the United
States should not exercise jurisdiction which circumvents the

73.
Id. at 6.
Both the El Salvadoran and South African constitutional courts relied on
74.
Article 6(5) to justify their amnesty laws under international law. Id. at 223.
75.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol
II), art. 6(5), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions].
76.
Trumbull, supra note 67, at 285-86.
77.
See Lungisile Ntsebeza v. Daimler, AG, 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 248-49
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (summarizing the different torts recognized by Circuit Courts as falling
within the jurisdiction of the ATS).
78.
Chavez v. Carranza, No. 03-2932 M1/P, 2005 WL 2659186, at *1 (W.D.
Tenn. Oct. 18, 2005).
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"sovereign law of El Salvador."79 Carranza argued that the court
should dismiss the case based on the doctrine of international
comity.8 0
In In re South African Litigation, plaintiffs filed a suit against
several corporations that did business in South Africa during the
apartheid regime, alleging that they had "aided and abetted" the
government of South Africa in perpetrating "apartheid related
atrocities, human rights' violations, [and] crimes against humanity[,]"
among other things. 8 ' The defendants argued that the prudential
doctrines of "case-specific deference to the political branches,"
political question, and international comity required dismissal since
the suit would interfere with U.S. foreign policy and the government
of South Africa's domestic approach to crimes that occurred during
apartheid: the Truth and Reconciliation process. 82
In cases such as these, a federal court may rely on several
prudential doctrines to dismiss the case. The court may also rely on
the status of amnesties under international law in order to determine
whether they should give any deference to the foreign amnesty.
Given the debatable legality of certain amnesties under international
law, however, it is unclear to what extent federal courts may respect
a foreign amnesty under international comity or any other deferential
doctrine. As amnesties become more and more prevalent, and as
human rights activists look to the U.S. and the availability of the ATS
as a way to bring claims for human rights violations, it is unclear to
what extent federal courts will rely on these doctrines or
international law to resolve this conflict.

III. MUST COURTS DEFER TO FOREIGN AMNESTIES AND

DIsmiss ATS SUITS?
As discussed in Part II, federal courts may use several
prudential doctrines to dismiss ATS cases when faced with a
defendant who claims to be protected by a foreign amnesty law.8 3 Of
these doctrines, only international comity and a case-specific
deference to the political branches have been raised in defense
against ATS claims. 84 Courts may also look to international law for

Id. at *3.
79.
Id. at *3-5.
80.
81.
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 258 (2nd Cir. 2007);
Lungisile Ntsebeza, 617 F. Supp. 2d at 240-41.
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 261-62.
82.
See supra Part II.
83.
84.
See Chavez v. Carrariza, 559 F.3d 486, 495-96 (6th Cir. 2009) (raising the
issue of international comity); Khulumani, 504 F. 3d at 261-62 (discussing both
arguments). The act of state and the political doctrine have also been raised in ATS
cases, but are beyond the scope of this article.
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guidance on how to treat amnesty laws and to determine their
extraterritorial effect.
A. The Doctrine of InternationalComity
The doctrine of international comity is a loosely defined and
often confusing prudential doctrine.85 International comity is "the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive[,J or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights
of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of
its laws." 86
The Court's modern formulation of international comity in
Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Californianarrowed the types of cases
that could be dismissed on grounds of international comity by
requiring that there be a "true conflict" between U.S. and foreign law
before the court would dismiss the case.87 In Hartford, nineteen
states and several private plaintiffs alleged that certain London
reinsurers illegally conspired to coerce primary insurers in the U.S. to
offer certain insurance coverage in violation of the Sherman Act.88
The London reinsurers argued that their alleged conduct was entirely
consistent with the comprehensive regulatory framework that exists
in Britain.8 9 The Court held that "[s]ince the London reinsurers [did]
not argue that British law require[d] them to act in some fashion
prohibited by the law of the United States," and because they did not
"claim that their compliance with the laws of both countries is
otherwise impossible[,J" there was no conflict with British law.9 0 The
Court in Hartford, therefore, confirmed that the threshold question in
a comity analysis is whether a true conflict exists.9 1 Post-Hartford,
lower courts have resisted dismissing human rights claims in the
absence of a true conflict.92

85.
Michael D. Ramsey, Escaping "InternationalComity,"83 IOWA L. REV. 893,
897 (1998) (arguing that confusion occurs because "comity" actually refers to four
separate doctrines).
86.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
87.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993) (citing Socidt6
Nationale Industrielle A6rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
88.
Id. at 770.
89.
Id. at 798-99.

90.
91.

Id.
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 509 U.S. at 765; Socidtd Nationale, 482 U.S. at 555

(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also H.K. & Shanghai
Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir.1998) (interpreting
Hartford to require a finding of conflict first).
92.
See e.g., Bodner v. Banque Paribas, 114 F. Supp. 2d 117, 130 (E.D.N.Y.
2000) (determining that France had no conflicting law or policy and declining to
dismiss the case).
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However, if a true conflict is established, lower courts have
considered several additional factors to determine whether dismissal
on grounds of international comity is appropriate. The circuit courts'
criteria are slightly different than those found in the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. In
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of American National Trust and
Savings Association, the Ninth Circuit established a seven factor test
to determine "whether the interests of, and links to, the United
States .

.

. are sufficiently strong, vis-a-vis those of other nations, to

justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority."93 In addition to the
factors set forth in Timberlane, the Second Circuit has stated that the
objection of foreign government to U.S. adjudication bears significant
weight in comity analysis. 94 Thus, the approach of the circuit courts
and the Restatement (Third) generally "looks at the degree of conflict
with foreign law or policy; the connections of the parties and their
activities to the United States and to the foreign state; and the
importance of the regulation of the conduct at issue to the United
States and the foreign state."9 5
Courts may also look to the non-exhaustive standards set forth
in Foreign Relations Law Restatement § 403(2):
Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is
unreasonable is determined by evaluating all relevant factors,
including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e.,
the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has
substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for
the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the
regulation is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of
regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states
regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such
regulation is generally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or
hurt by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal,
or economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of
the international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity; and

93.
1378, 1384
94.
95.

Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'1 Trust & Say. Ass'n, 749 F.2d
(9th Cir. 1984).
Jota v. Texaco, 157 F.3d 153, 160 (2d Cir. 1998).
STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 2, at 357.
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Comment b explains that the list of considerations in §403(2) is not
exhaustive and "[n]ot all considerations have the same importance in
all situations; the weight to be given to any particular factor depends
upon the circumstances."9 7
In Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, the district court found that there
was a true conflict between the foreign state's law and the filing of a
claim under the ATS and thus proceeded with analyzing the conflict
according to the Restatement factors.9 8 The court found that Papua
New Guinea's Compensation Act, which "prohibit[ed] the taking or
pursuing in foreign courts of legal proceedings in relation to
compensation claims arising from mining projects and petroleum
projects in Papua New Guinea" was in direct conflict with the ATS
litigation brought by plaintiffs in the U.S. courts.99 The court held
that, while various factors pointed towards dismissal on the grounds
of comity, the war crimes and crimes against humanity claims were
not within the scope of the Compensation Act and that the crimes'
gravity "argues strongly in favor of the retention of jurisdiction."1 0 0
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court's refusal to
dismiss the war crimes and crimes against humanity claims on the
basis of comity.1 01
International comity is a discretionary doctrine, and courts have
noted that no nation is under an "unremitting obligation to enforce
foreign interests which are fundamentally prejudicial to those of the
domestic forum."1 02 The obligation of comity ends when the strong
public policies of the forum are vitiated by the foreign act. 10 3 For
example, in Pravin Banker Assoc. u. Banco Popular Del Peru the
Court of Appeals determined that the District Court was correct in

96.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987).
97.
Id. § 403 cmt. b.
98.
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 1116, 1201-08 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
99.
Id. at 1201-02.
100.
Id. at 1207.
101.
Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193, 1211 (9th Cir. 2007). The court
noted that the defendant had not appealed the district court's denial of the motion to
dismiss the war crimes and crimes against humanity claims on comity grounds, and
that it was within the district court's discretion to deny the motion. Id.
102.
Pravin Banker Assoc., LTD v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854
(2d Cir. 1997) (citing Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d
909, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
103.
Id.; see also Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mex., S.A., 44
F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir.1994) ("[C]omity should be withheld only when its acceptance
would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the nation called upon to give it
effect." (citing Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440
(3d Cir. 1971)).
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declining to extend comity to Peru's debt negotiations because doing
so would be contrary to two U.S. policy interests. 104
Thus, the application of international comity to the conflict
between ATS cases and foreign amnesties raises three critical
questions: (1) whether there is a true conflict; (2) if there is a true
conflict, whether the balance of the several factors requires adherence
to international comity; and (3) whether enforcement of the foreign
interest would be contrary to the policy interests of the U.S. In
Carranza,the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the
defendant's motion to dismiss on international comity grounds,
despite an amicus brief filed by the Republic of El Salvador stating
that the litigation interfered with its internal affairs. 10 5 The court
held that there existed no "actual conflict" between the domestic and
foreign law because there was nothing about the El Salvadoran
Amnesty Law that suggested that it "should apply or was intended to
apply" extraterritorially.10 6 Thus, the defendant could comply with
the laws of both states.1 0 7 Because the court answered the first
question in the negative, it was not necessary to evaluate the policy
interests of the U.S.
However, there are several problems with the international
comity analysis, particularly where disrespecting an amnesty may
complicate the relations between the U.S. and the foreign state. For
instance, in In re South African Litigation, both South Africa and the
United States were very concerned about the impact that the suit
would have on their foreign relations. 0 8 While the Second Circuit
ultimately declined to address the merits of the prudential doctrines
raised by defendants and instead remanded to the District Court for
further determination, it discussed international comity as if it were
a variant of the political question doctrine. 0 9 The Second Circuit
cited Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., which described international comity as
a doctrine which asks whether adjudication would "offend amicable
working relationships" with a foreign country.110 Judge Korman's
dissent also intertwined the reasoning for dismissal on international

104.
109 F.3d at 855.
105.
Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 495 (6th Cir. 2009).
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 2007).
South Africa submitted an ex parte declaration declaring that the proceedings
interfered with "a foreign sovereign's efforts to address matters in which it has the
predominant interest." Id. The U.S. State Department submitted a Statement of
Interest asserting that the adjudication "risks potentially serious adverse consequences
for significant interests of the United States." Id.
109.
Id. at 261-62.
110.
Id. at 262 (citing Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 448 F.3d 176, 178 (2d Cir. 2006)).
Beth Stephens analyzes the use of international comity in Bigio as a variant of the
political question doctrine. STEPHENS ET AL., supra note 3, at 358.
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comity grounds with the doctrine of case-specific deference and
political question.'
Thus it is likely that the lower court, and any
other court on appeal, will be influenced by the U.S. government's
historical support of South Africa's amnesty laws and the
declarations of both the South African and U.S governments in the
case.
In cases where courts construe international comity as a variant
of the political question doctrine, the analysis will most likely not rely
on the "true conflict" Hartford test. Instead, the court will evaluate
the conflict on the basis of the existing relationship between the U.S.
and the foreign country, taking into consideration the statements of
the foreign country and the statements of the U.S. government.112
Thus, the international comity analysis may be based on whether the
ATS litigation offends the "amicable working relationship" of the U.S.
and the foreign country." 3 This is very similar to the case-specific
deference referred to in Sosa1 4 and is therefore subject to the policies
of the political branches. However, as the next section will argue, the
legality of amnesties under international law constrains the court's
ability to defer to either the U.S. government or the foreign
government under the political question variant of the international
comity analysis.
B. The Legality of Amnesties under InternationalLaw
Even if there is a chance that courts will dismiss an ATS case
under international comity due to a desire to not offend amicable
working relationships, a court is further constrained from dismissing
an ATS case involving a foreign amnesty by international law. In
Sosa, the Court determined that the choice of law for the substantive
claim in an ATS claim would be international law.115 Thus, one must
consult the international law regarding whether an amnesty may
give impunity for violations of international law, such as crimes
against humanity, genocide, and war crimes, when a defendant
claims that an amnesty precludes suit under the ATS's "violation of
the law of nations" jurisdiction. When looking to international law to
evaluate the legality of the amnesty, a U.S. court must keep in mind
that "the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a

111.
Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 292 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
112.
See id. at 292-337 (Judge Korman urges dismissal because of the adverse
effect prosecution of these cases would have on relations between U.S. and other
countries).
113.
Bigio, 448 F.3d at 178.
114.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
115.
See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
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particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the
judiciary to render decisions regarding it."116
As mentioned in Part II, while it is established that amnesties do
not apply extraterritorially, the actual legality of amnesties under
international law is still subject to great debate among scholars.117
Some scholars argue that amnesties are not per se illegal under
international law because state practice and the international
response to amnesties are too inconsistent to create a customary
international norm against them." 8 More convincingly, however,
other scholars argue that amnesties that give impunity for jus cogens
crimes are illegal under international law.119
Despite the language in Protocol II, some scholars argue that the
duty to prosecute is enshrined in international conventions and
required by the customary international law status of crimes against
humanity as jus cogens crimes (which impose obligations erga
omnes).120 Jus cogens crimes have been "deemed so fundamental to
the existence of a just international legal order that states cannot
derogate from them, even by agreement."121 Therefore, amnesties
granting immunity for torture, genocide, slavery, apartheid, piracy,
and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions are illegal.122 Jus
cogens norms are related to the principle of universal jurisdiction,
under which "any state may exercise jurisdiction over an individual
who commits certain heinous and widely condemned offenses, even
The
when no other recognized basis for jurisdiction exists."s2 3
rationale behind this principle is that the crime committed was so
egregious that it is considered to be committed against all members of

Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
116.
Trumbull, supra note 67, at 285-86; see Sadat, supra note 69, at 1018-23
117.
(provides a discussion of the legality of amnesties under international law); see
generally NTOUBANDI, supra note 3, 34-37 (discussing criticisms of amnesties); O'SHEA,
supra note 41 (discussing how amnesties fit into international law).
See Trumbull supra note 67, at 290-91 (arguing that state practices do not
118.
support the claim that amnesties are illegal under international law).
119.
NTOUBANDI, supra note 3, at 229; O'SHEA, supra note 41, at 322.
120.

JEFFREY L. DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS PROCESS

58-59 (2d ed. 2006); see generally NTOUBANDI, supra note 3, at 229 (crimes against
humanity are a jus cogens norm); O'SHEA, supra note 41, at 322 ("[F]or an amnesty law
to comply with existing international law it should exclude from its scope a category of
the most serious crimes against international law.").
121.
DUNOFF ET AL., supranote 120, at 58-59.
122.
NTOUBANDI, supra note 3, at 229; O'SHEA, supra note 41, at 322 ("[For an
amnesty law to comply with a state's duty to prosecute, the amnesty law must
exclude ... : genocide, crimes against humanity, aggression, torture, slavery, piracy,
apartheid, summary executions, enforced disappearances, and grave violations of the
Geneva Convention of 1949.").
DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 120, at 380.
123.
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the international community, and so every state is granted
jurisdiction over the crime.124
First, the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the Convention Against
Torture, and the Genocide Convention are three widely ratified
treaties that impose an affirmative duty to prosecute particular
international crimes.1 25 The Geneva Conventions impose a duty to
prosecute perpetrators of acts described as "grave breaches."126
However, these grave breach provisions apply solely to international
armed conflict, and thus do not impose a duty on governments to
prosecute those within its own borders for serious crimes1 2 7 The
Genocide Convention requires that states criminalize and prosecute
individuals who commit genocide. 2 8 However, the duty to prosecute
under the Genocide Convention is severely limited and arises only in
specific situations. 129 The Convention Against Torture requires
states to criminalize and prosecute torture.18 0 It also requires states
to assert jurisdiction over the accused and to either extradite the
accused to the country of the crime or prosecute the accused under
domestic laws.' 8 '

124.
Crimes such as piracy, war crimes, genocide, and slave trade have been
accepted by states as permitting universal jurisdiction. Id.
125.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 72; Geneva Convention (1) for the
Amelerioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the
Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3314, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I];
Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick,
and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention (III) Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention (IV) Protection of Civilian
Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention IV]; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention ].
126.
Geneva Convention I, supra note 125, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra
note 125, art. 50; Geneva Convention III, supra note 125, art. 129; Geneva Convention
IV, supra note 125, art. 146; see generally NTOUBANDI, supra note 3, at 114-31, 229
(summarizing the Geneva Convention); Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The
Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537
(1991) (describing the obligations to prosecute under the Geneva Conventions).
127.
Michael P. Scharf, Swapping Amnesty for Peace: Was There a Duty to
Prosecute International Crimes in Haiti?, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1,- 20 (1998); see Geneva
Convention I, supra note 125, art. 2 (stating that the convention applies to cases of
declared war or other armed conflict); Geneva Convention II, supra note 125, art. 2
(same); Geneva Convention III, supra note 125, art. 2 (same); Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 125, art. 2 (same).
128.
Genocide Convention, supra note 125, art. 3.
129.
Trumbull supra note 67, at 288. To be guilty of genocide, a person must
commit one of the following acts with the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such." Genocide Convention, supra note
125, art. 3.
130.
Convention Against Torture, supra note 125, art. 4-6.
131.
Id. art. 5, 6.
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Some states and scholars who claim that amnesties are not per
se illegal under international law point to Article 6(5) of Protocol II to
the Geneva Conventions, which appears to endorse the use of
amnesties. 132 Article 6(5) states that the authorities in power at the
end of hostilities "shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible
amnesty to persons who have participated in the armed conflict." 33
However, it is not clear that amnesty under Article 6(5) was meant to
permit amnesties for jus cogens crimes "given the general framework
of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 requiring prosecution for grave
breaches of the Conventions." 134 Thus, an interpretation of Article
6(5) must take into account the prohibition of jus cogens crimes such
as crimes against humanity.1 3 5
Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan stated that, while
amnesty is legally acceptable to aid peace and reconciliation at the
end of internal conflict, the UN has "consistently maintained the
position that amnesty cannot be granted in respect of international
crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity or other serious
violations of international humanitarian law."136
The UN
Commission on Human Rights has stated that "amnesties should not
be granted to those who commit violations of international
humanitarian and human rights law that constitute serious
crimes."I 37 Despite these pronouncements, the UN supported the
1994 South African amnesty 3 8 and was involved in negotiations of a
blanket amnesty that attempted to resolve the conflict in Haiti in
1993.139
Additionally, three international courts have strongly
disapproved of amnesties but have not determined that they are

132.
See NTOUBANDI, supra note 3, at 223 ("Many recent decisions on amnesty
have relied on Article 6 (5) of Additional Protocol II of 8 June, 1977 as support for their
decisions that amnesties for serious human rights violations are permitted under
international law."). The South African Supreme Court interpreted Article 6(5) as
establishing "an exception to the peremptory rule prohibiting an amnesty in relation to
crimes against humanity contained in Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions." Id. (quoting Cape Provincial Division of the Supreme Court in Azanian

Peoples Organisation(AZAPO) & Others v Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1996
(4) SA 562 (CC) at 574 D-E (S. Afr.)). The Supreme Court of El Salvador also relied on
the provisions of Article 6(5) to validate their amnesty. Id. at 223.
133.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions, supra note 75, art. 6(5).
134.
NTOUBANDI, supranote 3, at 224.
135.
Id.
136.
Trumbull, supra note 67, at 292 (quoting The Secretary-General, Report of

the Secretary General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone,

1 22,

delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/2000/915 (Oct. 4, 2000)).
137.
Impunity, U.N. Commission on Human Rights Res. 2002/79, 58th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2002/79 (Apr. 25, 2002).
138.
Trumbull, supra note 67, at 293.
Id.
139.
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illegal.140 The Special Court for Sierra Leone found that the Lom6
Agreement, which granted broad amnesty, did not bar its universal
jurisdiction over international crimes since "a state cannot sweep
such crimes into oblivion and forgetfulness . . . [, as] the obligation to

protect human dignity is a peremptory norm and has assumed the
nature of obligation erga omnes."' 4 ' The International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia also refused to create a per se rule
against amnesties, but did say in dicta that "amnesties are generally
incompatible with the duty of states to investigate [torture]."142
Similarly, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights found
El Salvador in violation of its treaty obligations under Article 1 of the
American Convention on Human Rights1 43 and concluded in Masacre
Las Hojas v. El Salvador that the amnesty law was a violation of the
Salvadoran government's obligation to investigate and punish
violations of the Las Hojas victims. 144
It is true that some states continue to grant amnesties to
perpetrators of serious international crimes. 14 5 Even states that are
not affected by the crimes that amnesty covers have acted as third
parties in negotiating amnesties.1 4 6 A key example is the worldwide
support of South Africa's 1993 amnesty.147 The United States has
also supported a negotiated a 1993 amnesty for Haiti,14 8 and in 1996,
Mexico, Norway, Spain, the U.S., Venezuela, and Colombia facilitated
an amnesty for Guatemala.14 9 However, recent state practice
indicates that there is less and less approval of blanket amnesties

140.
These are: the ICTY, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights. But see Sadat, supra note 69, at 963-64 (arguing
that recent decisions from international and national courts provide an example of
international norm creation that amnesties are increasingly unacceptable).
141.
Prosecutor v. Kallon & Kamara, Case Nos. SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E), SCSL2004-16-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lom6 Accord Amnesty,
1,
65 (Mar. 13, 2004).
142.
Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija, Case No., IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, 1 155
n.172 (Dec. 10, 1998).
143.
INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE
SITUATION
OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
IN EL
SALVADOR (1994)
available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/ElSalvador94eng/toc.htm.
144.
Masacre Las Hojas v. El Salvador, Case 10.287, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report
No. 26/92, OEA/Ser.LV/II.83 Doc. 14 (1992).
145.
Trumbull supra note 67, at 2945-97(discussing that Argentina, Chile,
Uruguay, El Salvador, Guatemala, Peru, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Haiti, Sierra Leone,
Colombia, Afghanistan, and Algeria have provided amnesty to perpetrators of serious
international crimes in the past twenty-three years).
146.
Id. at 296.
147.
O'SHEA, supra note 41, at 42; Leila Sadat, National Amnesties and Truth
Commissions, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 193, 204 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004)
(hypothesizing that support for the amnesty might have been different if South Africa
had adopted a blanket, instead of conditional, amnesty).
148.
Trumbull, supra note 67, at 296.
149.
Id.
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which grant impunity for jus cogens crimes,1 50 and this practice has
been followed out of a sense of legal obligation.15 1 State practice need
not be "supported by every state at every moment in its political
history" to be customary international law. 152 Even some of the
countries which had originally granted amnesty for serious
international crimes have since found those amnesties illegal.1 53
Furthermore, more and more amnesty laws have included some
form of justice, truth, or reparations. 154 For example, Uruguay's
amnesty law permitted civil liability, 155 and the 1993 Haitian
amnesty decree excluded human rights crimes. 1 56
The most
prominent example has been South Africa, where individuals must
disclose their crimes to the Truth and Reconciliation Committee in
order to petition for amnesty.157 Even though the South African
Amnesty Law grants amnesty for crimes of apartheid, which is
technically a crime against humanity, it has been widely accepted by
other states and international institutions.15 8 This is because the
amnesty provisions were carefully calculated to be conditional upon
full disclosure of the crimes, and they also provided for civil suits and
criminal prosecutions if the amnesty application was rejected. 59
States have taken this approach out of a legal obligation to hold
criminals accountable in some way-if not criminally accountableand to give victims some form of justice or reparation. 60 In South
Africa, the government rejected calls for a blanket amnesty and
declared its intent to follow international law in drafting its amnesty
legislation.161
Due to what he considers inconsistent state practice, Charles
Trumbull has proposed a balancing test to accommodate the
"competing interests of justice and peace" as an alternative to a clear-

150.
Id. at 300-01; NTOUBANDI, supra note 3, at 132-49; O'SHEA, supra note 41,
at 228-266.
151.
NTOUBANDI, supra note 3, at 132-49; O'SHEA, supra note 41, at 228-266.
152.
O'SHEA, supra note 41, at 263; see NTOUBANDI, supranote 3, at 134 ("[O]nly
substantial uniformity is required, not complete uniformity.").
153.
See e.g., Argentina Holds Dirty War Trial, June 21, 2006, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hilworldlamericas/5099028.stm (explaining how the Supreme
Court of Argentina overturned amnesty laws in June 2005); Larry Rohter, Chile's
Leader Attacks Amnesty Law, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/
12/24/worldlamericas/24chile.htm1 (noting jurisprudence in Chile allows prosecution of
kidnappings since the crime is considered ongoing).
154.
Trumbull, supra note 67, at 301.
155.
O'SHEA, supra note 41, at 64.
156.
Id. at 68.

157.

John Dugard, Reconciliation and Justice: The South African Experience, 8

TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 277, 294 (1998).
158.
O'SHEA, supra note 41, at 42.
159.
Sadat, supra note 69, at 985-87 (noting only 849 of the 7112 applications
received by the Amnesty Committee of the Commission were accepted).
160.
Trumbull, supra note 67, at 301.
161.
Id.
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cut rule that delineates which crimes amnesties may not legally cover
under international law.162 Trumbull's perspective recognizes the
value of amnesties in bringing peace to civil wars that, if not stopped,
may cause more harm.163 The test evaluates (1) the process by which
the amnesty was enacted; (2) the substance of the amnesty
legislation; and (3) the domestic and international circumstances. 164
In evaluating the process, states should consider whether the
amnesty was passed by democratic procedures, the people had access
to adequate information, and the victims favored the amnesty. 165 The
second factor to be weighed, substance, should take into consideration
the "substantive measures [taken] to achieve some of the benefits
commonly associated with prosecution: accountability and
incapacitation."1 66
Finally, the third factor, international
circumstances, should make the international community "more
amenable to . . . amnesties when it appears that the amnesty is

reasonably necessary to end the hostilities."16 7
Trumbull's balancing test provides a useful way of analyzing the
legitimacy of amnesties, but it does not necessarily evaluate the
legality of amnesties. The balancing test weighs the benefits of
granting an amnesty and ending a civil war against the protection of
victims and the democratic process necessary to make the amnesty
legitimate.168 Trumbull's balancing test may reflect the realities of
the political situations regarding amnesties, but it does not further
the establishment of jus cogens norms against impunity for human
rights violations. Arguably, amnesties may be beneficial for a
particular country, particularly to end civil wars or bring transitional
justice, but the violation of jus cogens norms affects everyone in the
international community and should not go unnoticed. Interestingly
enough, the balancing test will often result in a recommendation
against amnesties that grant immunity for serious international
crimes, as the circumstances necessitating a blanket amnesty will
most likely be very difficult to prove.169 A clear-cut rule that
prohibits amnesty for jus cogens crimes is more in line with the
principle of universal jurisdiction and makes the availability of
justice for human rights violations more realistic.
This analysis of the scholarship pertaining to the legality of
amnesties, while not exhaustive, demonstrates that federal courts
need not defer to any amnesty that provides immunity for jus cogens

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 318.
at 312-17.
at 318.
at 320.
at 321.
at 322-23.
at 318.
at 337-39.
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crimes. The ATS clearly gives courts jurisdiction over "violations of
the law of nations[,]" which has been interpreted by Sosa to provide a
cause of action for a set of highly defined violations of customary
international law, such as jus cogens crimes.170 In fact, many ATS
cases cite the Restatement's list of customary international law
violations as content of international law.171 Section 702 includes
genocide; slavery or slave trade; murder or causing the disappearance
of individuals; torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; systemic
racial discrimination; or a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights. 72
However, the
Restatement emphasizes that this list is "not necessarily complete ...
[, as] human rights not listed in this section may have achieved the
status of customary law, and some rights might achieve that status in
the future." 7 3 Thus, any amnesty that provides impunity for widely
accepted, highly defined international norms is illegal, regardless of
whether a foreign state has decided to grant amnesty covering those
crimes.
In certain circumstances, however, an amnesty that provides
immunity for a serious crime may actually meet developing standards
of legality if it has provided for some form of justice, either through
reparations, civil liability, or truth and reconciliation. 174 One
example of this is the amnesty in South Africa. Because the South
African amnesty requires perpetrators to speak the truth about their
crimes or be subject to criminal or civil liability if they do not, the
international community has given much deferential respect to South
Africa's amnesty.175 South Africa is thus viewed as a country that
addresses human rights violations instead of one that just sweeps
them under the rug.176 Furthermore, Sosa cautioned that courts
should be sensitive to the exhaustion of local remedies, and thus
where a foreign state's amnesty provides for some form of remedy for
serious violations of human rights and jus cogens crimes it may be
appropriate for a U.S. court to defer to those remedies. 7 7

170.
171.

See supranotes 27-29 and accompanying text.
STEPHENS, ET AL., supra note 2, at 70.

172.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(1987).

§ 702

173.
Id. § 702 cmt. a. However, Sosa said that the Restatement's listing of a
violation may not be sufficient to provide the clear definition required to trigger ATS
jurisdiction. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 737 (2004).
174.
See supra notes 145-149 and accompanying text.
175.
Sadat, supra note 147, at 204.
176.
Id.
177.
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21.
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IV. No DEFERENCE FOR BLANKET AMNESTIES
From the analysis above, it appears that a U.S. court would not
be required to dismiss an ATS case implicating a foreign domestic
amnesty under either the doctrine of international comity or under
international law.178 Recent formulations of international comity do
not require courts to dismiss a case involving a foreign amnesty
because there is most likely no true conflict between the foreign
amnesty-which does not apply extraterritorially-and the domestic
ATS litigation.' 79 In fact, most courts will likely not dismiss cases
involving foreign amnesty.18 0 However, in certain cases, courts are
inclined to interpret the international comity analysis as a question of
whether the adjudication would "offend amicable working
relationships" due to the nature of the relationship between the U.S.
and the foreign government.181 In those cases, U.S. courts should
proceed with an ATS case regardless of the existence of a foreign
amnesty when the amnesty permits impunity for jus cogens crimes
for which erga omnes obligations attach.182 This solution contributes
to the developing norm against impunity for serious international
crimes, while at the same time furthering the purposes of the ATS by
giving victims of "violations of the laws of nations" a consistent
remedy in U.S. courts.18 3
First, and most simply, it is established under international law
that amnesties have no extraterritorial effect.184 Thus, courts should
decline to find a conflict under the analysis provided in Hartford 8 5
This permits courts to advance the purposes of the ATS and the
intent of Congress-as demonstrated by their support of the TVPA-

178.
See supra Part III. Unfortunately, this solution is still susceptible to Sosa's
"case-specific deference to the executive." Using the example of litigation against
corporations who had done business in South Africa, the Supreme Court suggested that
"there is a strong argument that federal courts should give serious weight to the
Executive Branch's view of the case's impact on foreign policy." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733
n.21. In making this statement, the Court cited Republic of Austria v. Altmann, a case
that stated that the State Department's opinion of the implications of exercising
jurisdiction over a particular case "might well be entitled to deference as the considered

judgment of the Executive on a particular question of foreign policy." Id. (citing
Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 702 (2004)).
179.
See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
180.
See supra note 92.
181.
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 262 (2d Cir. 2007).
182.
These would be genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, crimes
against peace, torture, piracy, and slavery.
183.
See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
184.
See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
185.
See e.g., Chavez v. Carranza, 2005 WL 2659186, at *4 (W.D.Tenn. Oct. 18,
2005) ('"Where, as here, 'a person subject to regulation by two states can comply with
the laws of both,' there is no conflict for comity purposes." (quoting Hartford Fire Ins.
Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 764, 799 (1993))).
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to provide a remedy for victims of "violations of the law of nations."186
While the Hartford analysis provides a simple and uninteresting
solution to the conflict between an ATS claim and a foreign amnesty,
some courts may apply a different international comity standard that
permits the inclusion of political question-type factors in the analysis
due to the confusion over the doctrine of international comity.
In some ATS cases, courts may be persuaded by statements
made by the U.S. government and foreign countries to dismiss the
litigation out of respect for the working relationship between the U.S.
and the foreign country.' 8 7 For example, a court may be influenced
by the fact that the U.S. government supported a particular amnesty,
8 8 and In re South African
as the defendants argued in both Carranzas
89
Litigation
Yet, victims of serious international crimes should not
be excluded from remedy under the ATS simply because the U.S. at
one point supported or helped negotiate a peace that involved an
amnesty law.
In Sosa, the Supreme Court clarified that the
substantive violation in an ATS case is governed by international
law.19 0 This means that U.S. courts may look to international law
when evaluating amnesties and that "there is little doubt that
international law is incorporated into United States domestic law as
a form of federal common law."' 9 ' If the violation exists under
international law, then no blanket amnesty should be permitted to
override the U.S. courts' ability to provide a remedy.
A case-by-case analysis, in which courts determine the legality of
the particular amnesty by using a balancing test or evaluating the
amnesty in light of the country's international obligations to
prosecute particular crimes, may serve "the interest of justice more
than a per se rule."192 However, a case-by-case approach fails to
capture the benefit of promoting jus cogens norms and the
prosecution of those who violate such norms.' 9 3 In fact, recognizing
amnesties that ignore obligations of international law "would seem
contrary to the foundational principles of international . . . law, and

stand[s] in opposition to the clear weight of authority and much of the

186.
H.R. REP. No. 102-367, at 3, (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 84
(stating that the ATS has "important uses and should not be replaced").
See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
187.
188.
The defendants in Chavez v. Carranza,559 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2009), were
supported by an amicus filed by The Republic of El Salvador. Brief of The Republic of
El Salvador as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d
486 (6th Cir. 2009) (No. 06-6234).
189.
See e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 258 (2nd Cir.
2007) (noting that amicus briefs were filed by the U.S. government and the government
of South Africa).
190.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725-26 (2004).
191.
Casto, supra note 32, at 641.
192.
Sadat, supra note 69, at 1028.
193.
Id.
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state and international practice emerging in this field."194 Thus, the
performance of a balancing test as suggested by Charles Trumbull is
unworkable for U.S. courts;195 instead, U.S. courts should decline to
defer to a foreign amnesty law that provides amnesty for jus cogens
crimes-and any other crimes-for which the U.S. courts have
jurisdiction under the ATS jurisprudence.19 6
First, this clear-cut rule for when a court may or may not dismiss
an ATS claim based on a foreign amnesty is consistent with the
requirement in Sabbatino that U.S. courts rely only upon firmly
established customary international law.' 97 Keeping in mind that
state practice need not be entirely consistent, blanket amnesties that
provide impunity for jus cogens crimes are illegal under international
law and should not be given deferential treatment in U.S. courtsregardless of U.S. politics or foreign policy.
Second, support for this solution is found in Justice Breyer's
concurrence in Sosa. Justice Breyer "endorsed that the principle of
universal civil jurisdiction is a safeguard of international comity."19 8
The concurrence reiterated that international law "will sometimes
similarly reflect not only substantive agreement as to certain
universally condemned behavior but also procedural agreement that
universal jurisdiction exists to prosecute . . . torture, genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes,"1 99 otherwise known as jus cogens
crimes. Justice Breyer concluded that "[t]he fact that this procedural
consensus exists suggests that recognition of universal jurisdiction in
respect to a limited set of norms is consistent with principles of
international comity," and that the adjudication of foreign conduct
involving foreign parties "will not significantly threaten the practical
harmony that comity principles seek to protect." 200 Furthermore,
Justice Breyer determined that universal criminal jurisdiction
included the availability of civil tort recovery. 20 1 Thus, according to
Justice Breyer, federal courts may exercise a type of universal civil
jurisdiction over jus cogens crimes without respect for a foreign
amnesty.
An application of this solution to the Caranza and In re South
African Litigation cases illustrates that courts have thus far denied
dismissal on the basis of international comity and have correctly
interpreted the legality of amnesties-or at least hinted at a correct
194.

Id.

195.
Trumbull, supra note 67, at 318.
196.
See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (describing crimes that fall
within "law of nations.").
197.
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
198.
Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, The Emerging Recognition of
Universal Civil Jurisdiction,100 AM. J. INT'L L. 142, 148 (2006).
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 762 (2004) (Breyer, J., concurring).
199.

200.

Id.

201.

Id. at 763.
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interpretation. In El Salvador, the blanket amnesty provides
impunity for serious international crimes. 202 Therefore courts should
decline to dismiss an ATS case based on both international comity
and international law. In fact, that is exactly what the Sixth Circuit
did.20 3 The court held that there was no true conflict between the
foreign amnesty law and the ATS jurisdiction because El Salvador's
amnesty did not apply extraterritorially. 204 Although it did not need
to reach the question of the amnesty's legality, had the court done so,
it would have found that the amnesty law provided a blanket
amnesty for jus cogens crimes and thus violated international law. 205
The result in In re South African Litigation is also illustrative.
On remand from the Second Circuit, the District Court held that
"case-specific deference" did not require dismissal of the plaintiffs'
claims. 206 First, the court acknowledged that international comity
was part of a case-specific deference.20 7 Despite the statements filed
by the U.S. and South Africa, the court refused to dismiss the case
based on international comity because the court found no true conflict
between the South African amnesty and the ATS, as the Sixth Circuit
did in Carranza.208 The court noted that the South African amnesty
does not give blanket immunity and "provides immunity against suit
only to those who testified voluntarily." 209 Because the defendants
decline to participate in the truth and reconciliation process, they
were not granted amnesty and were free to be sued in other forums
since the truth and reconciliation "process was not exclusive." 210
Thus, while the District Court followed the analysis in Carranza,the
Second Circuit opinion and Judge Korman's strong arguments that
domestic remedies preclude suit under the ATS demonstrate that
there are still judges and courts that may be more persuaded by the
statements of governments. 211 In that case, dismissal for casespecific deference or political question reasons would still be
permissible under the legality of amnesties analysis in Part III.B, as
the South African amnesty is not unconditional or absolute like El
Salvador's and does not necessarily violate international law. 212
El Salvador Amnesty Decree, supra note 62, art. 1 (granting general
202.
amnesty without regard to whether the crime committed was international in nature).
203.
Chavez v. Carranza, 559 F.3d 486, 495 (6th Cir. 2009).
204.
Id.
205.
See Trumbull, supra note 67, at 285 (discussing the legality of amnesties).
206.
Lungisile Ntsebeza v. Daimler, AG, 617 F.Supp.2d 228, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
207.
Id.
208.
Id. at 286.
209.
Id.
210.
Id. at 285-86.
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd, 504 F.3d 254, 292-337 (2nd Cir.
211.
2007) (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See NTOUBANDI, supra note 3, at 151-85 (discussing amnesty law in South
212.
Africa).
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V. CONCLUSION

A defendant's claim that a foreign amnesty precludes suit under
the ATS provides an interesting example of the conflict between the
growing international desire to hold perpetrators of human rights
violations accountable and the desire to respect, out of international
comity, a nation's own determination of the best way to bring peace,
stability, and healing to a violent civil war. U.S. federal courts
confronted with this conflict may rely on several prudential doctrines,
such as international comity, the act of state doctrine, the political
question doctrine, and case-specific deference to the political branches
to avoid adjudicating a foreign sovereign's internal affairs. Given the
complexity of the doctrine of international comity and the resulting
confusion over how to apply it to different situations, courts may be
tempted to give deference to a foreign nations' amnesty lawespecially considering the impact their adjudication would have on
the relationship between the foreign nation and the U.S.
However, the ATS has granted U.S. courts jurisdiction over
violations "of the law of nations," and Congress, in enacting the
TVPA, underscored the purpose of the ATS and its ability to provide a
remedy to victims of violations of jus cogens norms in the United
States. Thus, federal courts should resist pressure by the political
branches to dismiss a case for international comity reasons, and
instead should look to the legality of the particular amnesty under
international law. An analysis of international law demonstrates
that amnesties that provide blanket immunity for serious
international crimes, such as violations of jus cogens norms, are
illegal. Given this illegality-under the same standard that has
given ATS plaintiffs a cause of action-courts should not defer to a
foreign amnesty law that provides impunity for jus cogens crimes or
violations of customary international law, even in the face of political
pressure from the U.S. and other countries. While certain forms of
amnesties may provide a beneficial-and in some cases the only-way
to stop violence and the perpetuation of human rights violations, jus
cogens norms are so fundamental that they cannot be derogated,
swept under the carpet, or ignored.
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